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 18 
Noting important recent discoveries, we review primate social learning, traditions and 19 
culture, together with associated findings about primate brains. We survey our current 20 
knowledge of primate cultures in the wild, and complementary experimental diffusion 21 
studies testing species’ capacity to sustain traditions. We relate this work to theories that 22 
seek to explain the enlarged brain size of primates as specializations for social 23 
intelligence, that have most recently extended to learning from others and the cultural 24 
transmission this permits. We discuss alternative theories and review a variety of recent 25 
findings that support cultural intelligence hypotheses for primate encephalization. At a 26 
more fine-grained neuroscientific level we focus on the underlying processes of social 27 
learning, especially emulation and imitation. Here, our own and others’ recent research 28 
has established capacities for bodily imitation in both monkeys and apes, results that are 29 
consistent with a role for the mirror neuron system in social learning. We review 30 
important convergences between behavioural findings and recent non-invasive 31 
neuroscientific studies.  32 
33 
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1. Introduction 68 
 69 
 Recent decades have seen enormous strides in our knowledge and understanding of 70 
many aspects of primate social cognition (de Waal and Ferrari, 2012; Mitani et al., 71 
2012; Seyfarth and Cheney, 2015a,b) and discoveries about primate social learning, 72 
traditions and culture have been prominent in the progress made (Whiten et al., 2011; 73 
Whiten, 2012; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013; Watson et al., in press). These latter topics 74 
provide the focus for the present review. In discussing ‘social learning’ we take a broad 75 
perspective, taking this to include all learning from others, whether from their actions or 76 
the results of those actions (Heyes, 1994). Some outcomes of such social learning may 77 
be relevant only for a short while, such as which trees are currently in fruit, but others 78 
are longer lasting and may give rise to traditions (Whiten and van Schaik, 2007). We 79 
follow Fragaszy and Perry (2003, p. xiii) in defining traditions as “a distinctive behavior 80 
pattern shared by two or more individuals in a social unit, which persists over time and 81 
that new practitioners acquire in part through socially aided learning”. Of course “two 82 
or more individuals” is a minimal criterion and traditions can be regarded as more 83 
robust the more widely they spread between individuals, between groups and through 84 
larger populations. In relation to “persists over time”, they are similarly more robust the 85 
longer they last, which may or may not involve multiple generations. ‘Culture’ is a 86 
more contentious term. Many authors treat ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ as essentially 87 
synonyms, but others, often mindful of how much more complex human culture is than 88 
anything encountered in other species, suggest we gain more insight by requiring 89 
additional criteria for culture, such as being based on imitation and teaching (Galef, 90 
1992) or involving multiple and diverse traditions (Whiten and van Schaik, 2007), 91 
features thought to be particularly distinctive in human culture. 92 
 We relate discoveries about primate social learning and culture to neuroscience in 93 
two main ways. First, at a relatively ‘macro’ level we review evidence that the size of 94 
the brain or major parts of it are associated with an emphasis on the extent or nature of 95 
social learning in the species concerned. This perspective invokes what has accordingly 96 
been called the ‘cultural intelligence hypothesis’ (Whiten and van Schaik, 2011). This 97 
in turn can be considered a special case of the ‘social intellect’ (Whiten and Byrne, 98 
1988a) or ‘social brain’ (Dunbar, 1998) hypotheses to explain primate intelligence, so 99 
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we begin our review with a brief overview of these ideas and the evidence bearing on 100 
them, relevant for the overarching topic of ‘social cognition’ in this journal theme issue. 101 
At a second, more ‘micro’ level we note the relevance of discoveries about the scope of 102 
imitative matching and learning in primates to the operation of mirror neurons, that fire 103 
both when an animal executes a certain action or observes it performed by others. This 104 
discussion begins with non-human primates, in which mirror neurons were first 105 
discovered (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), but extends importantly to humans, in which 106 
associations with imitation were first identified (Iacoboni et al., 2001; see Molenberghs 107 
et al., 2009, Iacoboni, 2010, and Ferrari and Rizzolatti, for reviews) and where 108 
distortions in the mirror system have been hypothesized to be linked with autism 109 
(Williams et al. 2001).  110 
 111 
2. Social intelligence and the ‘social brain’ of primates 112 
 113 
 Humphrey (1976) was the key originator of what came to be called the “the social 114 
intellect hypothesis”. The core of his proposition was that the acknowledged lively 115 
intelligence of non-human primates (henceforth ‘primates’) was not adapted so much 116 
for dealing with physical problems in domains such as foraging and avoiding predators, 117 
but instead reached its highest sophistication in grappling with the special complexity 118 
being discovered in primates’ social lives. Such ideas were prefigured by some earlier 119 
speculations about primate social complexity (e.g. Jolly, 1966) but Humphrey expressed 120 
the theory in an explicit and articulate fashion with major impacts on primatologists 121 
conducting empirical studies, who were beginning to record the social complexities he 122 
alluded to.  123 
 124 
2.1 Social and Machiavellian intelligence hypotheses 125 
 126 
Just over a decade later, sufficient empirical work on primate social cognition and 127 
complexity that included shifting alliances and coalitions (de Waal, 1982), social 128 
knowledge (Cheney et al., 1986) and tactical deception (Whiten and Byrne, 1988b) had 129 
accumulated, collated in the first integrative volume on the topic: Machiavellian 130 
Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). The title echoed de Waal’s account of the 131 
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dynamic power manoeuvrings amongst chimpanzees (Chimpanzee Politics, 1982) 132 
which could quote the advice given by Nicolo Machiavelli (1531) about how politicians 133 
could socially manipulate their subjects, because it so well matched chimpanzees’ 134 
tactics. Byrne and Whiten emphasized not only the devious social scheming for which 135 
Machiavelli has bequeathed his name to everyday language, but rather, the key mix of 136 
competitive and cooperative manoeuvres that Machiavelli identified. Management of 137 
such social tactics creates pressure for greater skill in others, in the potentially spiralling 138 
Machiavellian arms races that Humphrey first sketched. Humphrey (1976) compared 139 
primate social life to a game of chess, in which one’s gambits were played out in a 140 
social arena where the other players are constantly reactive and responsive. This may 141 
create a selection pressure for increasingly nimble social tactics, that can be expected to 142 
evolve up to a ceiling of social cognition limited only by the economics of devoting 143 
sufficient neural and other resources to such functions (see Isler and van Schaik, 2014, 144 
on the ‘expensive brain framework’). 145 
 Whiten & Byrne (1988a) distinguished three levels of the social or ‘Machiavellian’ 146 
intellect hypothesis (‘MIH’). The most basic is the hypothesis that in contrast to much 147 
early work that focused on intelligence in relation to physical problems typical of 148 
comparative psychologists’ laboratories, primate intelligence in the wild is actively 149 
engaged with social life. This version of the hypothesis may appear elementary today, 150 
but has driven over two decades of ingenious research identifying the complexities of 151 
primate social cognition, in both wild and captive primates (Seyfarth & Cheney, 152 
2015a,b, and papers in this journal issue).  153 
 The second and more ambitious version of the hypothesis proposes that intelligence 154 
has been moulded more by social life than by physical demands such as foraging and 155 
predator evasion. Version three goes further, to propose that the very nature and scope 156 
of intelligence has been shaped by these social selection presses, so that primates’ 157 
brains and cognitive potentials have become specifically adapted for dealing with 158 
complexities characteristic only of the social realm. What Humphrey (1976) called 159 
‘natural psychology’, later called ‘Theory of Mind’ or mindreading, offers a striking 160 
example, that stimulated productive empirical research with primates particularly in the 161 
present century (Call and Santos, 2012; Whiten, 2013; Krupenye et al. 2016; Meunier, 162 
this issue).  163 
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 To many primatologists who in their research on primate social life have daily been 164 
impressed by its intricacies, these hypotheses may have an inherent plausibility, but 165 
testing them rigorously is challenging. One early approach to this was due to Dunbar 166 
(1995), who examined the relationship between measures of a primate species’ relative 167 
brain size – encephalization – and the average size of social groups in the species, 168 
adopted as an initial, if very basic, measure of social complexity. Remarkably, despite 169 
the crudeness of both measures, Dunbar found the positive relationship between them 170 
that the second version of the MIH predicts (Fig. 1). Dunbar dubbed the neural version 171 
of the MIH supported by such discoveries the ‘Social Brain Hypothesis’ (Dunbar, 1998; 172 
and see Brothers (1990) for a pioneering exploration of the concept of a ‘Social Brain’). 173 
The variables involved in such tests, group size and neural volumes, may be crude but 174 
are more amenable to straightforward measurement than either social complexity or the 175 
sophistication of social cognition. The tractability of the approach has generated a 176 
substantial corpus of studies further exploring these relationships, that we briefly review 177 
next. 178 
 179 
 < insert figure 1 about here > 180 
 181 
2.2 Social complexity and encephalization: empirical tests 182 
 183 
 Although social complexity and degrees of encephalization are in principle subject 184 
to empirical measurement, this does not mean the process is straightforward. For 185 
example, larger animals tend to have larger brains, so such allometric relationships must 186 
be allowed for; and concerning social complexity, a meaningful social unit needs to be 187 
focused on, which is inherently challenging in fluid or hierarchically structured primate 188 
communities.  189 
 Controlling for body size has been addressed by controlling directly for this 190 
variable by regressing brain size first on body size and then considering residuals – but 191 
this is not straightforward because the effects are nonlinear.  A variety of alternative 192 
approaches have been developed. For example, Dunbar (1998) measured the ‘neocortex 193 
ratio’, the ratio of neocortex volume to the volume of the remainder of the brain, and 194 
found this index to be positively correlated with a species’ average group size. This was 195 
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not the case for other, ‘ecological variables’ like home range size, which would be 196 
expected if primate intellect has evolved for dealing with physical complexities such as 197 
navigation and foraging on a complex distribution of foods. Accordingly Dunbar’s 198 
results supported the social brain hypothesis. More refined measures of social 199 
complexity have also been explored, such as the size of the social ‘cliques’ that concern 200 
an individual’s most intense social relationships (Kudo & Dunbar, 2001), and the 201 
frequency of ‘tactical deception’ episodes reported in the research literature (Whiten & 202 
Byrne, 1988b; Byrne & Corp, 2004), with the predicted relationships with neocortex 203 
ratio again confirmed.  204 
 When such analyses have been extended to birds, it was not the size of social 205 
communities or social systems that explained relative brain size, but rather the mating 206 
system, with the greatest encephalization in those species with long-term pair bonding 207 
(Emery et al. 2007). Shultz and Dunbar (2007) further explored the sociality-208 
encephalization relationship in carnivores, bats and ungulates as well as primates and 209 
found that pair-bonding was most strongly related to relative brain size in all of these 210 
taxa except primates. What might explain this? Emery and colleagues as well as Shultz 211 
and Dunbar shared the interpretation that in both birds and mammals, pair-bonding and 212 
the bi-parental care associated with it involve the management of intimate co-ordination 213 
and synchrony, which selects for encephalization. In primates it is suggested that 214 
analogous, bonded, and intricately negotiated relationships extend the same principles 215 
across larger social networks (Emery et al. 2007; Shultz & Dunbar, 2007). Shultz and 216 
Dunbar (2010) further showed that encephalization is most marked in those taxa of 217 
mammals with higher degrees of sociality, of which primates typically offer prime 218 
examples, supporting the social brain hypothesis from another perspective. 219 
 These broader taxonomic analyses suggest interesting implications for the evolution 220 
of the human ‘social brain’ (for reviews of this work, see Dunbar & Shultz, 2007, 221 
2010). First, we humans are primates, so this body of research suggests that our 222 
sophisticated social brains did not emerge ‘out of the blue’, but instead have evolved on 223 
the back of socially-driven neural adaptations widespread amongst primates, implying 224 
an important shared pre-human ancestry.  Second, we are unusual amongst the apes to 225 
have developed pair-bonding, found to be a modal characteristic of those hunter-226 
gatherer societies that offer the best models for our evolutionary past ways of life 227 
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(Marlowe, 2005; Whiten and Erdal, 2012). In such societies, there is bi-parental 228 
investment because fathers invest in the development of their offspring in a variety of 229 
ways from food provisioning to education, for example in relation to hunting (Hewlett 230 
et al. 2011). These two features, the complex social life we share with other primates 231 
(and have made even more elaborate: Whiten and Erdal, 2012) and more unusual  pair-232 
bonded parental investment embedded within band life, may together help to explain the 233 
unique degree of encephalization that has tripled the brain size of our species in just 234 
over two million years. As we shall see below, these characteristics take on special 235 
significance in the realm of social learning and culture.  236 
 Of course, such effects of selection for social cognitive sophistication on primate 237 
brains have been enmeshed in a complex web of other factors. Such benefits are 238 
energetically costly, so can only evolve if they achieve payoffs that more than 239 
compensate for this, which in turn can be expected to be associated with adaptions to 240 
particular types of ecological niche and other factors such as life history variables. Such 241 
dynamics are beyond the scope of this review but have been explored in some depth for 242 
both non-human and human primates by Isler and van Schaik (2014). 243 
 Despite such complexities, further explorations of relationships between social 244 
complexity and brain variation in both human and non-human primates have extended 245 
to consider particular parts of the brain (Platt et al. 2016). In humans, for example, the 246 
size of peoples’ social networks predicts the volume of regions such as the amygdala, 247 
implicated in emotional responses and vigilance (Bickart et al. 2011) as well as other 248 
parts involved in social functions such as the orbitofrontal cortex (Powell et al. 2012 ) 249 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Lewis et al. 2011). Kanai et al. (2011) showed that 250 
the number of people’s Facebook friends is correlated with the density of grey matter in 251 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and temporal gyrus. 252 
 253 
3. Cultural intelligence and the ‘cultural brain’ 254 
 255 
In more recent years a ‘cultural intelligence hypothesis’ (CIH) has been developed in 256 
part to address findings that the MIH does not explain well, notably the large absolute 257 
and relative brain sizes of the great apes, not all of which live recognizably complex 258 
social groups (van Schaik, 2006; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007; van Schaik and Burkart, 259 
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2011). However the CIH should apply to all species where cultural transmission 260 
becomes extensive and/or complex in nature.  261 
 The CIH can be regarded as in some respects a descendant or subsection of the 262 
MIH, and in some respects a competitor to it. It can correctly be thought of as a 263 
subsection insofar as it focuses on social learning, which provides one component of 264 
social complexity. Thus, Whiten and Byrne (1988a), in dissecting a suite of facets of 265 
‘Machiavellian intelligence’ such as social knowledge and theory of mind, already 266 
included social learning and cultural transmission. Allusions to these dimensions of 267 
complexity in the social worlds of primates had in fact been made earlier in the 268 
foundational articles of Jolly (1966) and Humphrey (1976). As Whiten and van Schaik 269 
(2007) noted, the largest part of a major compilation of work under the title of ‘social 270 
complexity’ was already headed ‘cultural transmission’ (de Waal and Tyack, 2005). 271 
However, to properly explicate the CIH, we need first to offer an overview of what we 272 
have learned of the scope of culture in non-human primates.  273 
 274 
3.1  The scope of ‘culture’ in primates 275 
 276 
 The study of potential cultural behaviours in wild primates has long been led by 277 
chimpanzee researchers, from Goodall (1986) through McGrew (1992) to Boesch and 278 
Tomasello (1996) charting accumulating evidence that, like people, chimpanzees 279 
behaved in different ways across their distribution in Africa, with circumstantial 280 
evidence such as youngsters’ intense peering at adult tool use indicating a cultural basis. 281 
The first systematic syntheses became possible when the leaders of nine long-term 282 
projects collaborated to agree behavioural definitions and pool their data (Whiten et al., 283 
1999, 2001). Starting with 65 candidate behaviour patterns, 39 were identified as 284 
putative cultural variants (traditions) because they were common in at least one 285 
community yet absent in at least one other, with no apparent genetic or environmental 286 
explanations (such as being determined by the availability of key resources). This 287 
number of traditions was unprecedented in comparison to existing reports for other 288 
animals, that typically reported just one or a handful of such variants; moreover they 289 
spanned much of chimpanzees’ repertoires, with examples from tool use for foraging, 290 
comfort and hygiene purposes, grooming, communication and sexual behaviour. Each 291 
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community was found to exhibit a unique array of such variants so that a chimpanzees’ 292 
behavioural profile could be sufficient to allocate it to the region in which it lived; a 293 
cultural ‘quilt’ diagram illustrating such patterning, after Whiten et al. (1999) is 294 
illustrated in electronic supplementary information in Figure S1 along with a later, more 295 
fine-grained one. 296 
 Although these findings did not discriminate between specific potential social 297 
learning mechanisms responsible, they nevertheless have profound implications for 298 
primate social cognition, because they imply that these apes live in a cognitive world 299 
that is shaped by the cultural variants of their parents or parental generation in a 300 
significantly rich way. 301 
 An extensive range of supplementary chimpanzee studies followed, illustrated by 302 
selected examples in Table 1, and other fieldworkers applied what came to be called the 303 
‘method of exclusion’ (inferring cultural transmission where environmental and genetic 304 
explanations were judged implausible) to other species. Thus orangutans were reported 305 
to display over 20 (later, over 30) cultural variants (van Schaik et al. 2003; for follow up 306 
studies see Table 1), leading to the inference that this degree of cultural complexity 307 
would likely have characterized the common ancestor of all the great apes, around 14 308 
million years ago (van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007). Likewise, a 309 
consortium of gorilla researchers have recently produced a similar analysis reporting 23 310 
different cultural variants (Robbins et al. 2006).  311 
 312 
 <  Insert Table 1 about here > 313 
 314 
 Other primates have since been reported to sustain cultures constituted by multiple 315 
traditions of different kinds, notably spider and capuchin monkeys (Santorelli et al. 316 
2011a; Perry et al. 2003; Table 1 and Figure S1 c). Interestingly, these species exploit 317 
ecological niches in the New World that share some commonalities with those favored 318 
by chimpanzees in the Old World, and they are also large-brained; spider monkeys have 319 
the largest brains amongst New World primates and capuchins have the highest 320 
encephalization quotient (brain size corrected for body size) of any monkey. Such 321 
features are consistent with the cultural intelligence hypothesis that we discuss next, 322 
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which proposes an adaptive linkage between encephalization and the complexity of 323 
cultural transmission on which a species relies.  324 
 However, we note that the number of species for which serious investigations on 325 
the scope of culture have been published remains regrettably small, as Table 1 326 
demonstrates. This may be due in part to the demanding requirement for long-term 327 
studies of multiple groups of the same species, of which there are still all too few. This 328 
means that we must be correspondingly cautious about the significance of those species 329 
mentioned above, that are prominent in the table so far – an issue we return to in the 330 
section that follows. 331 
 332 
3.2 The cultural intelligence hypothesis 333 
 334 
Measures of encephalization and social complexity exhibit a good fit across primates as 335 
a whole, but the fit is better if the great apes are considered separately, because as a 336 
family they are even more encephalized (Fig. 1). This difference is not well explained 337 
by the social intellect/brain hypotheses, because aside from chimpanzees’ distinctive 338 
fission-fusion communities, the apes cannot be claimed to exhibit greater social 339 
complexity. Noting the complexity of culture attributed to the great ape family on the 340 
basis of the chimpanzee and orangutan field data outlined above, van Schaik (2006) and 341 
Whiten and van Schaik (2007) developed a ‘cultural intelligence hypothesis’ (CIH), 342 
proposing that the complexity of culture may help explain the enlarged brains of the 343 
apes. Like the MIH, the CIH is not inherently restricted to primates but could apply to 344 
any animals that display these characteristics, so other potential candidates might 345 
include large-brained cetaceans that evidence cultural complexity, spanning both vocal 346 
and behavioural domains (Rendell and Whitehead 2001; Whitehead and Rendell 2015). 347 
 The CIH is in one sense a competitor to the MIH insofar as its potential to explain 348 
encephalization is concerned, but equally it can be seen as a particular version of the 349 
social intellect hypotheses, emphasizing one particular component of an animal’s social 350 
life concerned with the transmission of culture. The CIH in turn embodies multiple 351 
strands. One is the proposition that ‘culture makes you smart’; that what a child or 352 
juvenile primate acquires from its cultural heritage gives it a greater competence in 353 
varied but important aspects of its daily life, ultimately enhancing reproductive 354 
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potential. In turn, the importance of culture to the species concerned is expected to 355 
shape and enhance the cognitive underpinnings of key cultural processes, and thus the 356 
corresponding structures in the social/cultural brain. This includes multiple capacities 357 
for (i) cultural transmission such as imitation, emulation and teaching, (ii) storage of an 358 
expanding cultural repertoire, and (iii) the intermittent creation of the innovations that 359 
feed cultural change. The hypothesis that ‘culture makes you smart’ is thus proposed to 360 
operate both on ontogenetic-developmental timescales and on the long-term evolution 361 
of species’ brains and culture-related cognitive capacities (van Schaik and Burkart 362 
2011). 363 
 Evidence supportive of these hypotheses comes from a variety of sources across  364 
humans, apes, other primates and non-primates, explored by Whiten and van Schaik 365 
(2007) and van Schaik and Burkart (2011). In humans, of course, the proposition that 366 
‘culture makes you smart’ is uncontentious; indeed, it is the basis of our educational 367 
systems. For the non-human primates the hypothesis was originally developed to 368 
explain the particular enhanced encephalization of the great apes, and the evidence is 369 
arguably strongest for them. In chimpanzees, one particularly relevant study in the wild 370 
showed that juvenile females invested more time than did their male peers in closely 371 
observing their mother skilfully apply stem tools to extract prey from termite mounds 372 
(Lonsdorf et al. 2003). Most significantly, these females became ‘smarter’ in their 373 
mastery of the technique a whole year ahead of the males, also showing some matching 374 
to differences in mothers’ techniques (length of tool and depth of probing) than did the 375 
males. Such mastery is particularly important for females, who as adults spend more 376 
time in tool use for gaining invertebrate prey than males, who are able to gain more 377 
vertebrate prey through hunting (Whiten, 2006). More generally, most of the behaviour 378 
patterns in the corpus of putative chimpanzee traditions concern tool-aided or other 379 
forms of foraging technique. Becoming culturally competent in these techniques can 380 
significantly extend these animals’ lifetime success, as in helping them through dry-381 
season bottlenecks in fruit availability, where technology has been shown to provide 382 
critical access to other food sources such as nuts and otherwise resistant embedded food 383 
sources not available to other species (Yamakoshi, 1998).  384 
 Orangutan culture also incorporates such life-skills. Forss et al. (2016) and Burkart 385 
et al. (2017) suggest that in a species that depends significantly on cultural transmission, 386 
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there will be correlated selection on individual intelligence. Forss et al. (2016) provide 387 
evidence in support of this insofar as Sumatran orangutans, which display a more 388 
extensive and complex cultural repertoire than their Bornean cousins, achieve more in 389 
zoo-based tests of ‘general intelligence’ and have marginally but significantly larger (by 390 
2-12%) brains.  391 
 Experimental studies complement and reinforce these findings from the field 392 
(Whiten, 2015). Multiple studies show that chimpanzee tool use is socially learned, 393 
through both dyadic experiments involving a single model and single observer (Whiten 394 
et al., 2004) and diffusion experiments in which different forms of tool use, seeded in 395 
different groups, pass from individual to individual, creating incipient traditions that 396 
deliver access to a food source otherwise unavailable (Whiten et al., 2007). Relevant 397 
examples of each are that East African chimpanzees who do not nut-crack in the wild 398 
learned to do so through observation of a skilled nutcracker (Marshall-Pescini & 399 
Whiten, 2008a); and that alternative forms of stick-tool use to solve an artificial 400 
foraging task spread further in the groups into which they were seeded (Whiten et al., 401 
2005).  402 
 A different kind of evidence supporting the CIH is that for both chimpanzees and 403 
orangutans, Whiten & van Schaik (2007) showed that greater opportunities to learn 404 
from others, deriving from more extended times in association with groupmates in some 405 
communities, predicted the acquisition of the more complex techniques of each ape’s 406 
cultures. In a more fine-grained study, Schuppli et al. (2016) recorded the intense 407 
‘peering’ behaviour of wild juvenile orangutans, finding its occurrence confirmed a 408 
suite of predictions concerning its role in skill acquisition, such as that relevant 409 
exploration was enhanced following close peering events of events like nest-building 410 
and tool use. A further, complementary kind of evidence is that the ‘enculturation’ of 411 
young apes raised in intimate relationships with human culture tends to create an 412 
enhanced capacity to learn by imitation and a corresponding repertoire of competences 413 
in aspects of the surrounding culture, from symbolic communication to use of artefacts 414 
ranging from cups to toothbrushes (Tomasello et al. 1993a; Tomasello and Call, 2004; 415 
Whiten, 2011). 416 
 The sophistication of social learning in the apes is also relevant and further 417 
reviewed in the following section. As noted above, the findings indicated in Table 1 418 
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together with their encephalization status suggests that both capuchins and spider 419 
monkeys may also fit the predictions of the CIH, even if the linkages are less robust for 420 
them. Supplementary experimental evidence is more lacking for these monkeys, but for 421 
capuchins at least, there is some evidence of social learning effects strong enough to 422 
sustain laboratory traditions (Dindo et al. 2008, 2009), and evidence for selective 423 
attention to the most proficient nut-cracking adult models has been documented in free-424 
ranging capuchins (Ottoni et al. 2005). By contrast we are not aware of any such 425 
experimental studies of social learning in spider monkeys, and the survival value of 426 
many of the cultural variants identified in the wild for this species (Santorelli et al. 427 
2011a) beg further study.  428 
 More broadly based evidence that social transmission  is associated with enhanced 429 
cognition comes from a study that identified correlations between a measure of 430 
encephalization (‘executive brain ratio’ – the volume of the cortex plus striatum, 431 
relative to brain stem) and the prevalence of social learning in a species, based on 432 
reports in the research literature (Reader & Laland, 2002). Social learning explained 433 
more of the variance than any of the other variables analysed in this study, with an r
2
 of 434 
0.48 (Fig. 2). Reader and Laland (p. 4440) concluded their results “suggest an 435 
alternative social intelligence hypothesis to those stressing the Machiavellian 436 
characteristics of mind-reading, manipulation and deception”; instead, “individuals 437 
capable of inventing new solutions to ecological challenges, or exploiting the 438 
discoveries or inventions of others, may have had a selective advantage over less able 439 
conspecifics, which generated selection for those brain regions that facilitate complex 440 
technical and social behaviour”.  441 
 442 
 < insert figure 2 about here > 443 
 444 
 This conclusion is clearly consistent with the cultural intellect/brain hypothesis. 445 
However, research particularly by Barton (2006; Barton and Harvey, 2000) has shown 446 
that many brain components coevolve as a network, so that more recent studies of this 447 
kind have tended to retreat to examining cognitive correlations with absolute brain size, 448 
or total brain size corrected for body size (see also Deaner et al., 2006). The most recent 449 
study in this line (Navarrete et al., 2016) was focused on primate innovation and tool 450 
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use, but also included the measure of social learning frequency employed by Reader and 451 
Laland (2002); it confirmed and extended their findings, concluding from the 452 
relationships between them that encephalization and capacities for both innovation, 453 
especially innovation involving tool use, and social learning coevolved. Inference of 454 
any simple directional causality between these cannot be established - most probably 455 
they influenced each other over their evolutionary history. Nevertheless, Navarrete et al. 456 
(2016)  suggest that one plausible interpretation of their findings is that “through social 457 
transmission many primates learn to exploit novel foods, and the resources so gained 458 
both aid survival and fuel brain growth” (p. 8). Moreover, in relation to the discussion 459 
of social intelligence further above, these authors note that the consistent linkage they 460 
find between “social group size and brain size support the established finding that social 461 
intelligence is an important driver of brain evolution” (p. 8). 462 
 Nevertheless, caution seems in order in relation to social learning in these studies, 463 
for the data used were simply those reported in the primate literature. They may thus be 464 
subject to several forms of bias, such as that certain researchers interested in topics like 465 
intelligence and culture selectively target what they anticipate are promising species, 466 
and these researchers may then be more likely to be motivated to put observations of 467 
corresponding behaviour into print for these species. Lefebvre (2013) discusses a 468 
variety of potential biases of this kind and how corrective measures may be 469 
implemented. 470 
 An intriguing complication in the picture is the discovery by Barton and Venditti 471 
(2014) that it is the cerebellum that has expanded fastest in the great ape family, a trend 472 
carried further in humans. It has been common to focus on the neocortex as the seat of 473 
ape, and particularly human intelligence, no less so than for social intelligence, yet as 474 
Barton and Venditti point out, the human cerebellum contains four times as many 475 
neurons as the neocortex and it has expanded at several times the rate of the neocortex 476 
amongst the apes. These authors calculate that as a result, in human evolution 477 
approximately 16 billion more cerebellar neurons have been added beyond expectations 478 
for our brain size, equivalent to all the neurons in the neocortex! Yet the cerebellum is 479 
the relative ‘Cinderella’ of the pair (in fMRI work, it is often even omitted from the 480 
image!) and its functions are less well understood. Barton and Venditti suggest that key 481 
functions in relation to their analysis are likely to include “learning of sensory-motor 482 
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skills, imitation, and production of complex sequences of behaviours” (p. 2442) and the 483 
cerebellum is in any case massively inter-connected with the neocortex. 484 
    485 
3.3 ‘Vygotskian’ and ‘cultural intelligence’ hypotheses 486 
 487 
The cultural inheritance hypothesis discussed above was developed to explain variance 488 
amongst non-human primates, and great ape encephalization and social learning in 489 
particular. It is important to recognize that Moll and Tomasello (2007) instead offered a 490 
potentially complementary,  human-focused ‘Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis’, 491 
proposing that “primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, 492 
but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even 493 
constituted by, social cooperation” and that “regular participation in cooperative, 494 
cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful 495 
forms of perspectival cognitive representation”. (p. 639). Lev Vygotsky’s name was an 496 
appropriate one to adopt for this, given his classic writings on culture and collaboration 497 
in cognitive development, and the hypothesis nicely complemented the broader CIH 498 
that Whiten and van Schaik contributed in the same themed journal issue (“Social 499 
intelligence: from brain to culture”; Emery et al. 2007). However, in presenting data 500 
supportive of these ideas from comparisons between children and other apes in social 501 
versus physical cognition, an article by Herrmann et al. (2007) now referred to the 502 
Vygotskian version as the “cultural intelligence hypothesis” - a potentially confusing 503 
step because this hypothesis, seeking to explain ape/human differences, has a different 504 
focus to the CIH which is about differences across primates and even broader classes of 505 
animal. Accordingly we advocate that either there be a reversion to the label of 506 
‘Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis’ to mark the specific scope explicated by Moll and 507 
Tomasello, or alternatively the two hypotheses may be harmonized with each other, 508 
each essentially representing different points along a continuum of complexities in 509 
cultural cognition on the one hand, and encephalization on the other. We advocate 510 
exploring the latter as an interesting option for future development.  511 
 512 
4. Social learning, brain circuits and the mirror neuron system 513 
  514 
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 Primate social learning has been studied for over a century (Whiten and Ham, 1992; 515 
Tomasello and Call, 1997) and has been yet more intensely researched in recent decades 516 
(Whiten, 2012). Much of this work in the last century focused on the question of what 517 
kinds of social learning processes were at work, but in recent years new perspectives 518 
have emerged. Notable amongst these has been an extension of experimental designs 519 
beyond the common ‘what does primate B learn from primate A?’ to social diffusion 520 
experiments in which the spread of socially learned information is tracked across and 521 
between groups, linking more directly with research on primate cultures at large, 522 
outlined above. A further new focus has been on adaptive, contextual selectivity in 523 
social learning, for example in relation to  preferential learning from certain classes of 524 
individual, such as those most skilled (Price et al. 2017; Watson et al. in press). As a 525 
result, we now know an enormous amount about social learning in a widening array of 526 
primates, less about the enormously complex underlying neuroscience of such learning. 527 
Further below we focus on potential links between aspects of our findings in primate 528 
social learning and some new discoveries about relevant neural circuits and the 529 
functioning of what has come to be called the mirror neuron system. 530 
 531 
4.1 Primate social learning: imitation, emulation and cultural diffusion 532 
 533 
 As animal social learning theory has developed, increasingly complex taxonomies 534 
dissecting the diverse psychological processes involved have been developed (Whiten et 535 
al. 2004; Hoppitt and Laland, 2008). However, three broad categories have dominated 536 
this research area: imitation, emulation and stimulus/local enhancement. 537 
 The distinction been emulation and imitation emerged when, in a study of 538 
chimpanzees’ social learning of using a rake to acquire food, Tomasello et al. (1987) 539 
observed that, although most chimpanzees did not copy the particular motor act a model 540 
used to acquire food, they did apply the tool more successfully than could be accounted 541 
for by mere ‘stimulus enhancement’, in which social learning involves only the drawing 542 
of attention to a particular object. Tomasello et al. suggested that the chimpanzees had 543 
observed “the relation between the tool and the goal” (p. 182) and learned “to use the 544 
tool in its function as a tool” (p.182), a type of social learning that Tomasello (1990) 545 
later labelled ‘emulation’. Tomasello noted that in emulation the observer may act “in 546 
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any way it may devise” (p. 284) to achieve the goal or result it had seen attained, thus 547 
contrasting with imitation, which is defined by matching to the actions of the model 548 
observed. Accordingly, to a first approximation, imitation is copying the actions of 549 
another individual, whereas emulation is copying only the results the model achieves. 550 
 A series of experiments comparing children’s social learning with that of 551 
chimpanzees and focused on emulation followed. In the first, children copied a human 552 
model’s trick of flipping over a pronged rake to pull in a reward and were described as 553 
imitating, unlike chimpanzees who used the tool without replicating the flip action and 554 
were therefore described as emulating (Nagell et al. 1993). Call and Tomasello (1994) 555 
found similar copying in orangutans. On the basis of such studies, Tomasello, Kruger et 556 
al. (1993a) argued that the earlier assumption that chimpanzees (and other primates) 557 
were capable of imitation was not supported; instead, they emulate, and the only true 558 
imitators are humans, who display high fidelity copying in childhood.  The case for this 559 
dichotomy between non-human primate emulation and human imitation has been 560 
supported by a growing set of studies over the years, and hypothesized to be key in 561 
explaining the gulf between the richness of human culture and particularly its 562 
cumulative nature, contrasting with the limited cultures of other primates (Tomasello et 563 
al. 1993a; Tennie et al. 2009). 564 
 However, results have also emerged in our own studies and those of others that 565 
indicate a measure of imitative capacity in both apes and monkeys. We review these 566 
studies below and suggest their relevance to the function of mirror neurons. Mirror 567 
neurons are a class of neurons identified in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys, 568 
that fire not only when the monkey performs a certain action such as grasping a food 569 
item, but also when it sees another monkey do this (Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014). In 570 
discussing the potential function of these neurons in primates, the researchers involved 571 
initially dismissed what might seem the most obvious – imitation – because they did not 572 
see evidence of imitation in their monkeys and they noted a current scepticism about the 573 
occurrence of imitation in monkeys generally, as noted above (see also Visalberghi and 574 
Fragaszy, 2002). Instead they proposed that the function of these neurons was in effect 575 
to ‘stand in the shoes of the other’ and through this mirroring, recognize the goals 576 
inherent in the actions of others (Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Gallese and Goldman, 1998).  577 
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 Our results concerning bodily imitation in monkeys and apes, reviewed further 578 
below, moderate this view that non-human primates lack the capacity for matching and 579 
replicating the actions of others apparent in human imitation. However there is another 580 
set of studies to which we draw attention, that demonstrate matching and replication on 581 
a scale relevant to the larger question of cultural transmission. These are cultural 582 
‘diffusion experiments’, that go beyond the classic, dyadic ‘does B copy A?’ design of 583 
most 20
th
 century research, instead tracking the outcome of an initial seeding of a novel 584 
behaviour as it spreads (or not), across multiple individuals. By 2008, Whiten and 585 
Mesoudi were able to review 33 such studies in animals, including 17 on primates. 586 
Whiten et al. (2016) have reviewed 30 further diffusion studies published since, of 587 
which as many as 20 were on primates and these are summarized in Table 2. The 588 
resilience of replication shown in these studies is very variable, which in itself is 589 
consistent with the relatively negative conclusions drawn about primates’ powers of 590 
copying outlined above. However, this corpus of studies includes some that do show 591 
considerable resilience. For example amongst the ape studies, Whiten et al. (2007) 592 
found that alternative foraging techniques (both with tool-use, and not) seeded in 593 
separate groups of chimpanzees spread with significant fidelity across these groups, and 594 
then to a second group who watched the first one, and in the same way to a third. 595 
Interestingly, some ‘corruption’ that occurred along the way, in which a few individuals 596 
discovered the technique used by the other group, were over-ridden such that the third 597 
group expressed good conformity to the technique originally seeded in the first group. 598 
Amongst the monkey studies we find a similar phenomenon, as alternative seeded 599 
foraging techniques spread across two groups of capuchin monkeys, showing occasional 600 
corruptions but nevertheless maintaining resilience of the alternative incipient traditions 601 
(Fig. 3; Dindo et al. 2009).  602 
 603 
 < insert figure 3 about here > 604 
 605 
 We highlight these studies here to emphasize that non-human primate social 606 
learning can be capable of significant copying fidelity, sufficiently potent to sustain 607 
alternative traditions. However such effects can also be fragile, with several studies in 608 
Table 2 reporting weak fidelity. Moreover, these studies do not discriminate whether 609 
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fidelity is maintained by imitation of the actions involved, or emulation of the results of 610 
actions (e.g. in Fig. 3, door rises versus door slides). This is an issue we consider in the 611 
two sections to follow and is a significant issue in the neuroscientific analyses of Hecht  612 
et al. (2013a,b) we shall discuss there.  613 
 614 
4.2 Forms of social learning in apes and monkeys; neural circuits and mirror neurons 615 
 Much more research on social learning has been undertaken with chimpanzees and 616 
other apes than with any species of monkey, and several of the methodological 617 
approaches have not been replicated for both monkeys and apes, so here we discuss 618 
apes (principally chimpanzees) first, and monkeys separately. 619 
  620 
4.2.1 Imitation, emulation and the scope of social learning in apes 621 
 622 
 Soon after setting out the basic ‘chimpanzee-emulators versus child imitators’ 623 
hypothesis, Tomasello and colleagues provided one particular exception. Savage-624 
Rumbaugh had remarked that chimpanzees and bonobos participating in her 625 
explorations of language-like abilities, which involved highly enriched learning 626 
contexts, displayed spontaneous imitation; accordingly, Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh 627 
et al. (1993b) conducted a battery of formal tests inviting the apes to copy a wide range 628 
of novel actions on objects, such as squeezing the bristles on a brush, or instead using it 629 
to paint some foam on the floor. Three chimpanzees with the most intense 630 
‘enculturation’ into human daily life displayed recognizable imitation in nearly half 631 
these cases, as did two year old children tested similarly, whereas other, mother-reared 632 
chimpanzees showed very little. Thus, here was evidence both that quite high fidelity 633 
copying is within the grasp of at least some non-human apes; and (ii) that it is 634 
significantly enhanced during development by an appropriate social environment. We 635 
suggest is it unlikely the latter conjures imitative ability out of the blue.  636 
 In this 1993 study chimpanzees were verbally invited to “Do what I do”, an 637 
approach that shared some methodological overlap with an earlier study by Hayes and 638 
Hayes (1952) in which a home-raised chimpanzee was first trained to imitate a series of 639 
actions on the invitation to “Do this”, then tested on a battery of more novel actions, 640 
many of which the chimp, Viki, was reported to copy. The basic approach was 641 
replicated by Custance et al. (1995) with two young non-enculturated chimpanzees, 642 
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with the important added rigor of responses being classified by coders blind to what 643 
action the chimpanzee had seen. This was also replicated by Call (2001) with an 644 
enculturated orangutan. In both studies response matches to each of the 48 test items 645 
could be identified at significant levels by the coders. The orangutan was reported to 646 
fully imitate 58% and partially imitate another 36% of the target items.  647 
 Such studies are important in relation to those definitions of imitation in which 648 
some authors require bodily matching between what the model does and what the 649 
observer does, to discriminate imitation of actions from emulation. All the target items 650 
of Tomasello et al. (1993b) employed objects, so it is difficult to rule out the possibility 651 
that the chimpanzees were replicating what the objects did, rather than actions of the 652 
model. By contrast the battery employed by both Custance et al. and Call included 653 
many purely bodily actions, including whole body ones like hugging oneself, and finer 654 
facial and manual actions, like ‘clap back of hand’.  These studies thus demonstrate a 655 
mapping in these apes of body-part, model-to-self correspondence, a finding that is 656 
further complemented by a study by Buttelmann et al. (2007) in which chimpanzees 657 
copied some bizarre uses of body parts such as a head touch to switch on a light.  658 
 Such bodily correspondence is what is coded in the firing of certain mirror neurons 659 
identified in the research program of Rizzolatti and colleagues cited above. Mirror 660 
neurons were discovered in, and have principally been further studied in, macaque 661 
monkeys rather than apes, but brain imaging with humans has identified regions 662 
homologous to those where mirror neurons are recorded in monkeys, that respond to 663 
observed actions of others in similar ways, and the network of these regions is referred 664 
to as the ‘mirror system’. Accordingly it is likely that mirror neurons are to be found in 665 
other primates including apes (indeed, mirror neurons for vocalization have also been 666 
reported in songbirds, that typically learn their song by copying others: Mooney, 2014). 667 
Moreover, through further fMRI studies, the human mirror system has been implicated 668 
in imitation, among other functions (Iacoboni et al. 2001; Iacoboni, 2012; Rizolatti et al. 669 
2001). Putting all these findings together, the demonstration of significant bodily 670 
imitation in chimpanzees now makes it a plausible hypothesis that mirror neurons 671 
support imitative functions in our closest ape relatives, that are capable of the degree of 672 
matching shown in the Custance et al. and Call studies. 673 
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 One fine-grained analysis within a chimpanzee social learning study appears 674 
particularly relevant to this likelihood. In a study of the social learning of nut-cracking 675 
in East-African chimpanzees, Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008b) reported that when 676 
naïve young recruits watched an older, skilled nut-cracking model, they would 677 
sometimes show some entrainment (even synchrony) of downward striking actions like 678 
those of the hammering model. This cannot be emulation because the recruit is holding 679 
no hammer stone and has no nut – it is pure bodily mimicry. Fuhrmann et al. (2014) 680 
have since analysed the relevant video records frame by frame, as shown in Fig. 4 (and 681 
see video clips in the electronic supplements to these two papers), allowing 682 
sophisticated time-series analyses to objectively confirm significant motor matching and 683 
entrainment, even though such phenomena appeared to repeatedly ‘spill over’ in the 684 
actions of only one youngster in particular. This kind of entrainment, linking visual 685 
perceptions of another’s actions with motor correspondences in oneself, is just the kind 686 
of linkage that is signalled by the firing of mirror neurons.  687 
 688 
 < insert figure 4 about here > 689 
 690 
 The same can be said for the reverse process of recognizing when another 691 
individual is imitating one’s own actions, which was first demonstrated in an 692 
experiment by Nielsen et al. (2005). In this study, after a period in which humans 693 
copied the spontaneous actions of a chimpanzee, the ape started to vary its actions with 694 
apparent intent, monitoring the imitative efforts of the human, and did so more than in a 695 
series of control conditions such as contingent but non-imitative responses. More recent 696 
studies have replicated the phenomenon, reporting it to be elicited by the imitative 697 
actions of a humanoid robot (Davilla-Ross et al., 2014) and to be correlated with 698 
variation in other social and communicative competencies (Pope et al., 2015). Such 699 
imitation recognition calls on neural mechanisms that code the correspondence between 700 
another’s actions and one’s own, just as the primary process of imitation does. 701 
 However, we note that bodily matching is not the only way imitation has been 702 
defined. Byrne and Russon (1998), in an influential theoretical analysis, suggested that 703 
alternatively one might see imitation in the overall sequential or hierarchical structure of 704 
complex actions like nut-cracking, a phenomenon they called program-level imitation. 705 
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Accordingly, Whiten (1998) demonstrated that chimpanzees a convergence, over a 706 
series of trials, on whichever of two alternative sequences of disabling defences of an 707 
‘artificial fruit’ they witnessed a model perform. An experiment by Horner and Whiten 708 
(2005) was in line with such conceptions but explored imitation versus emulation 709 
conceptualized as different ends of a continuum. In this study, when participant juvenile 710 
chimpanzees witnessed a model perform a sequence of tool-based actions on an opaque 711 
foraging task, it was predicted that a more complete imitative copy of the sequence 712 
would be seen than when the same task was transparent and the first segment of the 713 
action sequence could be seen to be causally unnecessary. This prediction was 714 
confirmed in the case of the chimpanzees, who thus produced a more ‘emulative’ 715 
response in the transparency condition. Surprisingly, in this study young children copied 716 
all segments of the sequence even in the transparent condition where causal irrelevance 717 
appeared visibly obvious, a disposition later dubbed ‘over-imitation’ (Lyons et al., 718 
2007). Such over-imitation has since become a vigorous field of research particularly in 719 
developmental psychology (Whiten et al. 2009; Nielsen et al., 2014). 720 
  A different way in which the emulation/imitation distinction has been approached 721 
is via a ‘ghost experiment’ in which there is no model visible to imitate, and all an 722 
observer can watch is the movement of the objects normally caused by a model. This 723 
can be achieved in various ways, such as mechanically or by appropriate video 724 
manipulation. Hopper et al. (2007, 2015) found that chimpanzees learned nothing from 725 
such scenarios in a complex tool use task; instead chimpanzees seem to need to see 726 
another chimpanzee acting on the objects, implicating at least some basic level of 727 
imitation. However, in a much simpler task Hopper et al. (2008) did find evidence for 728 
emulation in a ghost condition. Tennie et al. (2010) went further, showing that when 729 
chimpanzees could not copy how they saw a human pour water into a tube to make a 730 
desirable peanut float up to be grasped, because the chimpanzees did not have the bottle 731 
the human had used, some chimpanzees collected water from their drinker and spat it 732 
into the tube instead – an impressive display of imaginative emulation! 733 
 Taking account of this array of findings and others, Whiten et al. (2009) rejected 734 
the simple dichotomy of emulating apes versus imitative children, and instead 735 
concluded that all these species have a ‘portfolio’ of social learning processes that 736 
include imitative, emulative and other, simpler forms, applying these in often adaptive 737 
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ways, selectivity according to context. Such selectivity may take a variety of forms; one 738 
has already been outlined in the differential response of young chimpanzees to the 739 
transparent and opaque test boxes of Horner and Whiten (2005). Other forms include 740 
choices between alternative models to copy, such as ‘copy the most successful’ (Watson 741 
et al. in press; Price et al. 2017. 742 
 Another form of selectivity is to copy the majority, thus potentially benefitting from 743 
what many of one’s groupmates have found to be a preferred option to choose. Whiten 744 
et al. (2005) found evidence suggesting conformity to the majority in a diffusion 745 
experiment in which alternative tool-use techniques were seeded in two groups and 746 
spread further in them, creating incipient traditions. Several individuals subsequently 747 
discovered the technique used by the other group, but by two months later they tended 748 
to have converged again on the technique favoured in their own group. However, this 749 
was a post-hoc finding and not one explicitly tested by an experiment. This was done by 750 
Haun et al. (2012), who showed that chimpanzees preferred to copy the choices of three 751 
chimpanzees over a single one, demonstrating a ‘copy the majority’ rule of conformity. 752 
Results consistent with this have been reported from the wild by Luncz and Boesch 753 
(2012, 2014), who discovered different preferences for seasonal nut-cracking tools in 754 
neighbouring communities and that females, who transfer between communities, came 755 
to display the same preference as residents, implying that these immigrants conform to 756 
the local norms they experience after transferring communities. The phenomenon of 757 
conformity has become a topic of much interest, and also contention, in the field of 758 
animal social learning (Claidière and Whiten, 2012; van Leeuwen and Haun, 2014; van 759 
Leeuwen et al., 2016; Whiten and van de Waal, 2016.). 760 
 As will be apparent, the research literature on ape social learning has become huge, 761 
particularly for our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, and we have been forced to 762 
be highly selective in the above review. Topics not covered here for want of space 763 
include so-called ‘rational’ imitation (Buttelmann et al. 2007), the selective copying of 764 
intentional acts (Tomasello and Carpenter, 2005), teaching (Hoppitt et al. 2008) and 765 
cumulative culture (Dean et al. 2012). For complementary reviews that address these 766 
and other current issues in this area, readers may wish to consult Whiten and Erdal 767 
(2012), Galef and Whiten (2017), Whiten (2017, a, b) and Watson et al. (in press) as 768 
appropriate. 769 
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 770 
4.2.2 Imitation, emulation and the scope of social learning in monkeys 771 
 772 
 Several of the complementary approaches to imitation that have been brought to 773 
bear on apes are not available for monkeys. For example, efforts to train monkeys to 774 
‘Do-as-I-do’ have met with no success (Mitchell and Anderson, 1993; Fragaszy, 775 
Deputte et al. unpublished, cited in Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 2002). This in itself 776 
suggests an intriguing difference between apes and monkeys, with the former appearing 777 
to be able to recognize the act of imitation itself, unlike the monkeys tested. To our 778 
knowledge, episodes of model-observer ‘entrainment’ like that outlined above for nut-779 
cracking chimpanzees have also not been recorded in monkeys, and equivalent ‘ghost 780 
experiments’ have not been completed (although see further below for a novel variant 781 
employed by Subiaul et al., 2004). These contrasts suggest a lesser facility in imitation 782 
in monkeys compared to apes, and it is not uncommon for authors to state baldly that 783 
monkeys do not imitate (Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 2002). 784 
 Limited evidence for bodily imitation has nevertheless been published, employing 785 
an approach applied in avian studies, where observer birds who witnessed a model 786 
stepping on a treadle to obtain food as opposed to a model using their beak to depress 787 
the treadle, showed a significant tendency to use the same body part (Zentall et al., 788 
1996). Similarly, in a study of marmoset social learning of how to open a lidded food 789 
canister, those who watched a model using their hand to do so, as opposed to a model 790 
using their mouth, likewise showed a significant degree of using the same body part 791 
they had witnessed (Voelkl and Huber, 2000). This cannot be emulation because the 792 
result is the same in both cases: what is different is the action, which is what must be 793 
being replicated. The same authors later took a different approach to the question of 794 
imitation in their marmosets, performing a painstaking frame-by-frame analysis of the 795 
trajectory of a socially learned action that demonstrated a precision of matching to the 796 
model witnessed that departed significantly from chance (Voelkl and Huber, 2007). 797 
 Echoing the first marmoset study, van de Waal and Whiten (2012) offered similar 798 
food canisters with lids that could be popped off (‘aethipops’) to four groups of vervet 799 
monkeys in African sanctuaries. Most models and indeed most monkeys used their 800 
mouth to remove the lid, but in one group a model used her hands, and this method then 801 
spread significantly in her group (Fig. 5). Similarly in one group an individual grasped 802 
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the cords at the ends of the aethipop and pulled it apart like a Christmas cracker, a 803 
different approach that again spread significantly in this monkey’s group. As in the 804 
studies summarized above, differential matching of body parts cannot be explained by 805 
emulation but only by action imitation. 806 
 807 
 < insert figure 5 about here > 808 
 809 
 Such cases of matching are again consistent with the operation of mirror neurons, 810 
as is complementary evidence that monkeys may recognize when another individual - 811 
even a human - is copying them (Paukner et al., 2005). Paukner et al. (2009) showed the 812 
macaques who were imitated looked longer at the person than in non-imitative control 813 
conditions, and moreover, were more prepared to engage in social interaction (object 814 
exchanges) with the person. Accordingly, putting these studies alongside those in apes 815 
summarized above, we propose that it was premature to demote imitative learning as an 816 
important potential function supported by this neuronal system in primates. 817 
 As was also the case for the ape research reviewed above, bodily imitation is far 818 
from the only topic being actively tackled with respect to social learning in other 819 
primates. An extensive range of studies has demonstrated social learning and cultural 820 
transmission in several species of monkeys and lemurs, even where these do not 821 
necessarily discriminate whether imitation or other processes are responsible. Several 822 
are included in the recent illustrations of diffusion experiments listed in Table 2 and 823 
others are reviewed by Subiaul (2007) and Whiten (2012). An innovative approach with 824 
macaque monkeys was described by Subiaul et al. (2004), in which a model received a 825 
reward after touching a series of images on a screen in a particular sequence 826 
independent of their (changing) locations in an array, while an observer monkey 827 
watched. The observer monkey was then later shown to learn such sequences faster 828 
themselves, implicating observational learning. Merely seeing the sequence occur 829 
without monkey actions, a kind of ghost condition, did not have the same effect. Subiaul 830 
et al. called the monkeys’ achievement ‘cognitive imitation’, to stress that this is a form 831 
of copying what others do that unlike in most studies in this area, does not involve the 832 
acquisition of a manipulative skill. However, we think the term rather unfortunate 833 
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insofar as it may imply that instances of skill learning are not cognitive, which seems 834 
misleading. 835 
 836 
 < insert Table 2 about here > 837 
 838 
 A different kind of evidence for imitation concerns neonates. Meltzoff and Moore 839 
(1983) reported that human new-borns showed evidence of mimicking facial 840 
movements, discriminating tongue protrusion from mouth opening, for example. 841 
Meltzoff (2005) later linked the primordial bodily mapping implicated in neonatal 842 
imitation to the mirror neuron system, proposing both nativist and developmental 843 
elements. This work has been controversial, both with respect to whether such an 844 
infantile imitative capacity truly exists, and its relationship to later undisputed imitative 845 
competences (Oostenbroek et al., 2013, 2016), topics beyond the scope of this review. 846 
However, more surprisingly given the earlier, widespread dismissal of imitation in 847 
monkeys noted above, evidence for neonatal imitation in macaque monkeys has been 848 
offered by Ferrari and colleagues and again linked to the mirror system (Simpson et al., 849 
2014). However, the suite of publications reporting these findings emanate from one 850 
research group and remain to be replicated by others, so that given the controversial 851 
nature of the parallel human neonatal imitation evidence, we highlight these results as 852 
providing a convergent source of evidence on imitation in monkeys, but remain cautious 853 
about interpreting them further.  854 
 Selectivity in monkeys’ social learning has been shown in a number of studies. As 855 
for apes, these include biases about whom to learn from. Here questions shift from the 856 
cognitive abilities underlying different capacities for social learning to what motivates 857 
individuals to learn. De Waal (2001) conceptualised the latter in terms of what he called 858 
Bonding and Identification-based Observational Learning (BIOL), a motivation to be 859 
like others, such as one’s mother or peers, as opposed to being dependent on physical 860 
rewards to copying, such as gaining food items. An example comes from the vervet 861 
monkeys we study, where we have identified an initial bias to learn from one’s mother 862 
(van de Waal et al. 2013a, 2014). In the latter study this was revealed when the 863 
monkeys were supplied with sandy grapes, that mothers cleaned using one or more of 864 
several alternative techniques, which tended then to be adopted by their infants. Seeding 865 
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alternative ways to open an artificial fruit in different groups either in a sanctuary (van 866 
de Waal 2013b) or in the wild (van de Waal et al. 2010, 2015) demonstrated the spread 867 
of these alternatives via social learning, but the 2010 study revealed that this occurred 868 
only if the model was an adult female, not a male. This could make adaptive sense 869 
because females are the philopatric sex and are thus likely to provide the better models 870 
to copy than the males, who have immigrated into the group at some point and so have 871 
less experience about the optimal ways to behave in the local conditions pertaining. 872 
 Such migrant males, however, have provided evidence of conformity to majority 873 
preferences. In a study originally designed to examine the relative roles of social and 874 
individual learning in infants, two containers offering pink versus blue coloured corn 875 
were provisioned monthly, one made highly distasteful by soaking along with aloe 876 
leaves (van de Waal et al. 2013a). Two groups were in this way trained to avoid pink 877 
and two blue, while a new cohort of infants were suckling and taking no solid food. 878 
Several months later, when the corn options were offered again with no distasteful 879 
additive, adults maintained their bias and it was found that infants acquired this socially, 880 
adopting the preferences of their mothers and her group. Fortunately, in their migrations 881 
from pink to blue preference groups or vice versa, adult males provided a different class 882 
of individuals naïve to the local colour norm. Surprisingly, after watching the local 883 
monkeys eating, as many as nine of these ten males switched preferences already in 884 
their first choices, once they were not outranked by residents and could freely choose, 885 
demonstrating a remarkable degree of conformity. A different kind of evidence for the 886 
potential potency of social learning was offered by Perry (2009), who showed that 887 
despite young white-faced capuchins’ experience with two alternative ways to open a 888 
difficult fruit, they eventually tended to settle on the one they had witnessed most.  889 
 890 
4.2.3 Neural circuits, mirror neurons and social learning in primates 891 
 892 
By contrast with all that has been learned about social learning and cultural transmission 893 
in many species of primate over the last century, neuroscience is only in the early stages 894 
of beginning to address these phenomena. Neuroscience, including that focused on 895 
mirror neurons, has tended to dismiss monkeys as simply not imitating. In part this may 896 
reflect the dispositions of the macaque monkeys studied in the neuroscience laboratories 897 
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concerned, and in part a limited reading of the literature. As reviewed above, there are 898 
reports of imitation in monkeys, that have perhaps not yet come to the attention of many 899 
neuroscientists. Similarly for apes, neuroscientists often cite conclusions from research 900 
groups who argue that apes emulate rather than imitating (Tennie et al. 2009), and in 901 
any case apes have been spared invasive neuroscience such as the single unit recording 902 
that identified mirror neurons. 903 
 However, some recent neuroscientific investigations have begun to interdigitate in 904 
interesting ways with the findings of comparative psychology concerning social 905 
learning. Hecht et al. (2013b) used positron emission tomography (PET) functional 906 
neuroimaging to record regions showing overlapping ‘mirror’ activation in relation to 907 
‘transitive’ actions defined by having an object as their target, in both humans and 908 
chimpanzees, the latter being understudied in this respect, as we noted earlier. As 909 
predicted, such activation was recorded in chimpanzees in a distributed front-oparietal 910 
network homologous with that identified in earlier studies of the mirror systems of both 911 
macaque monkeys and humans. However whereas macaques characteristically show 912 
mirror responses only to goal-oriented, object-directed (transitive) actions (Rizzolatti et 913 
al. 1996), chimpanzees were found to resemble humans in also showing activation to 914 
transitive actions; indeed, transitive and intransitive activations were similar across 915 
regions homologous with those in which mirror neurons have been recorded in 916 
macaques.  917 
 Accordingly, the authors propose that the striking pattern of similarities and 918 
differences they report “suggests that chimpanzees map not only the results but also the 919 
movements of observed actions to the same brain regions that produce those actions. 920 
This may be a correlate of, and a prerequisite to, the ability to copy specific 921 
movements.” (Hecht et al. 2013b, p. 14129). This discovery appears entirely consistent 922 
with the conclusion of our review above, that chimpanzees are not limited only to 923 
emulative learning about the results of their actions, but also have in their social 924 
learning ‘portfolio’ an imitative capacity. These neuroscientific results are consistent 925 
with and may help explain the capacity of chimpanzees to learn, and show some facility 926 
in, ‘Do-as-I-do’ games, which are largely based on a battery of intransitive actions like 927 
‘grab thumb’ (Table S1 in supplementary information) (Whiten and Custance, 1996), as 928 
well as monkeys’ repeated failure to master this game (Whiten et al., 2004). Nor are the 929 
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results inconsistent with our conclusions above concerning evidence of imitation in 930 
monkeys, because this derived from transitive actions on object where there was match 931 
to what was observed (e.g. oral versus manual foraging actions). 932 
 Complementary convergences between neuroscience and our behavioural 933 
findings also emerged through a related study by Hecht et al. (2013a) which applied the 934 
technique of diffusion tensor imaging to trace neural connections within mirror 935 
networks in macaques, chimpanzees and humans. The principal result of most interest 936 
in the present context concerns contrasts between ventral and dorsal streams of visual 937 
information processing, the existence of which have been important topics in 938 
neuropsychology for some time (see Milner and Goodale, 2008, for a recent ‘re-view’). 939 
In the present context the important findings were that on the one hand, a ventral stream 940 
was found to be robust in all three species, indicating a route of information between 941 
temporal areas (superior temporal sulcus) initially processing biological motion, inferior 942 
temporal cortex processing objects (that may include tools) and frontal areas processing 943 
actions goals. The authors suggest this stream will support extraction of action end-944 
results or goals, the focus of emulative responses shown by all these species. However, 945 
dorsal streams contrast with the ventral streams along a continuum, being most robust in 946 
humans and least so in the macaques, with chimpanzees showing an intermediate state 947 
of development. Since these dorsal streams from temporal sensory areas to frontal areas 948 
link in inferior parietal cortex that is involved in the more fine-grained mapping of 949 
movements, the authors suggest this corresponds to the continuum from monkey to 950 
chimpanzee to human in their facility in discriminating and copying finer motor 951 
patterns. The authors’ schematic interpretation of these findings is illustrated in figure 6, 952 
which also indicates both (i) connections between parietal mirror regions and inferior 953 
temporal cortex, important in processing of tool characteristics, that are stronger in the 954 
tool-using chimpanzees than the monkeys, and yet stronger in humans; and (ii) 955 
connections between frontal and parietal regions extended further into superior parietal 956 
cortex in humans, an area associated with spatial awareness and attention. The authors 957 
speculate that the latter may support enhanced awareness of the trajectories of other’s 958 
actions, and these areas are activated during re-creation of humans’ early lithic tool-959 
making (Stout et al. 2008; Hecht et al. 2015; and see Frey (2007) and Arbib (2010) for 960 
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further exploration of dorsal and ventral streams in relation to tool use, tool making and 961 
language).  962 
 The mirror system may encode others’ actions in the frame of one’s own motor 963 
system, but this also requires that the distinction be recognised between the actions of 964 
self and other. Using an ingenious approach in which two macaque monkeys monitored 965 
each other’s actions, Yoshida et al. (2011) identified neurons in medial frontal cortex 966 
that selectively encode actions that are taken by the other.  967 
 968 
 < insert figure 6 about here > 969 
 970 
 The neural processing models portrayed in figure 6 appear highly consistent with 971 
the more detailed review of ape and social learning capacities we reviewed earlier. The 972 
consistency is perhaps most obvious in the case of the social learning portfolio we 973 
described for chimpanzees. The only real difference is that while Hecht et al. adopt the 974 
common view in neuroscientific works (e.g. Tramacere et al. 2016), we have 975 
summarized the evidence that imitation is shown by at least some monkeys. However, 976 
we suggest that in fact there is no real disagreement here, because (i) the monkey cases 977 
all involve transitive actions, as noted above; and (ii) the dorsal stream is not absent in 978 
the monkey brains; rather, the proportion of dorsal to ventral white matter is simply 979 
less. This fits entirely with our portrayal of the current picture of social learning in 980 
monkeys, apes and humans. 981 
 982 
4.3 Imitation, autism and the human mirror neuron system 983 
 984 
 An autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a condition marked by often quite severe 985 
disturbances in relating socially to others. Through the last several decades, ASD has 986 
been attributed to deficits and delays in social cognition, notably mindreading or theory 987 
of mind, which has become a dominant explanatory factor (Frith and Hill, 2003). 988 
However others noted early difficulties in imitation too, and developed a theory that 989 
such deviations from normal development may represent the first stages in difficulties 990 
in translating between the perspectives of others and oneself, a fundamental process that 991 
underlies both imitation in its earliest stages, and theory of mind as it becomes 992 
elaborated through the childhood years (Rogers and Pennington, 1991).  993 
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 As noted earlier, studies from Iacoboni et al. (2001) onwards have identified 994 
imitation as one of the functions served by the mirror neuron system in humans. Noting 995 
this and the evidence of early problems in imitation in autism, Williams et al. (2001) put 996 
these findings together and suggested that at the core of ASD might be some non-997 
normal developments in the mirror system, possibly including the inhibitory controls 998 
implicit in it. The latter is emphasized because on the one hand, the downstream effects 999 
of premotor mirror neurons firing need to be inhibited, or we should all be constantly 1000 
mimicking the actions of those we are watching; and on the other hand, although 1001 
children on the autism spectrum may show deficits in imitation, they also often display 1002 
behavior like echolalia, where they simply echo back things that are said to them in an 1003 
uninhibited fashion.  1004 
 This theory was suggested as a prospect to explore. It has been contentious, with 1005 
disputes about both the reality of imitation deficits and delays in autism (Williams et al. 1006 
2004; Vanvuchelen et al. 2013) and the explanatory role of the mirror neuron system 1007 
(Williams et al. 2007; Southgate and Hamilton, 2008). However a recent review by 1008 
Perkins et al. (2010) concluded that “evidence from functional MRI, transcranial 1009 
magnetic stimulation, and an electro-encephalic component call the mu rhythm suggests 1010 
MNs are dysfunctional in subjects with ASD” (p. 1239). Problems may entail not so 1011 
much the basic function of mirroring as the control of such processes, as alluded to 1012 
above. For example, Martineau et al. (2010) concluded that “hyperactivation of the pars 1013 
opercularis (belonging to the MNS) during observation of human motion in autistic 1014 
subjects provides strong support for the hypothesis of atypical activity of the MNS that 1015 
may be at the core of the social deficits in autism” (p. 168). 1016 
 1017 
5.  Concluding Discussion  1018 
 1019 
  We have offered a review of progress in the study of primate social learning at 1020 
several levels the phenomena span, from the underlying mechanisms to the scope of 1021 
traditions and cultures in wild populations. As we hope to have demonstrated, the 1022 
research literature has burgeoned in all these domains in recent years and we now know 1023 
a great deal about each of them, even though in many cases we have extensive 1024 
knowledge for a handful of favoured species but know little concerning a majority of 1025 
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primates. Nevertheless, we have accumulated much secure knowledge based on solid 1026 
and rigorously researched studies, whether from purely observational approaches, or 1027 
tightly designed experiments. Neuroscientific analysis of social learning and cultural 1028 
transmission are much younger sciences and still in their early stages. On the one hand, 1029 
the ‘macro’ analyses of the correlates of encephalization appears to remain highly 1030 
contentious and difficult to interpret; while at the more detailed level of neural networks 1031 
and mirror neurons, the empirical literature remains small, particularly for apes (Hecht 1032 
et al. 2013a,b; Tramacere et al. 2016). 1033 
 Mindful of the latter, we have focused our review of social learning on relatively 1034 
complex levels of social cognition that cover imitation and emulation, in part because of 1035 
the theme of the current issue of the journal and in part because of the neuroscientific 1036 
relevance of ‘mirroring’ others. In relation to our highlighting here of the topic of bodily 1037 
imitation, we note that our review suggests that the methodological and evidence base 1038 
for apes is often different to that for monkeys. 1039 
 Thus, for apes we have a cluster of ‘Do-as-I-do’ studies that are important in 1040 
exploring the range of bodily matches that apes can register. This approach, not so far 1041 
achieved for monkeys, allowed an extensive range of action matchings to be 1042 
systematically tested, demonstrating, for example that touches to non-visible body parts 1043 
like the back of the head can be copied, and that apes often begin their copying attempt 1044 
by repeating one of the approximating training actions, then adjusting it to generate a 1045 
better match (Custance et al. 1995). Similarly, the motor mimicry subjected to mico-1046 
analysis in the case of chimpanzees learning to nut-crack has no counterpart we are 1047 
aware of in monkeys. Nor have the ‘ghost’ conditions applied in several ape studies 1048 
been applied in monkey experiments, although the condition in Subiaul et al. (2004) in 1049 
which a sequential pattern of images was displayed without a monkey touching them 1050 
may be regarded as formally similar even if physically quite different approach. Finally, 1051 
ape experiments in which the sequential or hierarchical structure of complex actions has 1052 
been manipulated (Whiten et al. 2003) appear to have no counterpart in monkey studies, 1053 
although this takes us beyond bodily matching. 1054 
 However, monkey studies also include approaches yet to be replicated for apes. 1055 
Arguably the key method is two-action studies where the two alternatives involve 1056 
differences at a bodily level, such as completing an action using one’s hands versus a 1057 
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different effector, like mouth or head. As noted earlier, this approach has been used 1058 
more generally in comparative psychology but, perhaps strangely, not with apes. Of 1059 
course the Do-as-I-do method involves all kinds of body-part matching, but it is a test of 1060 
what apes can do, rather than what they spontaneously do, which is what has been 1061 
tested in monkeys and other animals. The precise bodily trajectory matching identified 1062 
by Voelkl and Huber (2007) also has no apparent counterpart in ape studies and indeed 1063 
may be a unique application of this approach. The same may be said of the method used 1064 
by Subiaul et al. (2004) to identify what they called ‘cognitive imitation’ in macaques, 1065 
but this was expressly not concerned with bodily imitation. 1066 
 One of the few methods that have been applied to both monkeys and apes is 1067 
assessing their recognition of being copied by others, and such recognition has been 1068 
demonstrated for both. However in this case, apes and monkeys still appear to respond 1069 
differently. Apes have demonstrated this recognition in what we may regard as an 1070 
explicit fashion, appearing to be intrigued by the bodily matching of their imitator, and 1071 
experimenting with their own actions to see what copies the other (human) individual 1072 
delivers. Monkeys have not shown such responses, and their recognition of being 1073 
copied has been assessed more indirectly, by their visual attention and subsequent 1074 
affiliative behaviour. Perhaps apes’ explicit responses reflect the same underlying 1075 
representation of the act of imitation that underlies their capacity to learn the Do-as-I-do 1076 
game. 1077 
 Despite the differences in how imitation has been investigated in apes and 1078 
monkeys, in each case multiple methods have been applied, providing some degree of 1079 
convergent evidence on the reality of the imitative capacity of interest, and as discussed 1080 
in section 4.2.3, there is some recent exciting convergence with non-invasive 1081 
neuroscientific studies with apes, as well as monkeys. Some of the experimental 1082 
methods, such as Do-as-I-do, have been applied to both apes and monkey but found not 1083 
to be workable. Others, such as two-bodily-action experiments, should in principle be 1084 
applicable to both. We hope that some of the varied and ingenious behavioural and 1085 
neuroscientific approaches we have reviewed, not only with respect to imitation but to 1086 
the many other aspects of social learning traditions and culture, will be applied more 1087 
broadly in future and help build a more comprehensive comparative analysis of primate 1088 
social learning. We close by noting that the subtitle of ‘The Primate Mind’, edited by de 1089 
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Waal and Ferrari (2012) – ‘Built to Connect with Other Minds’ - is apt to our topic, but 1090 
also reminds us that this umbrella term covers several related topics beyond the scope of 1091 
our review, such as empathy and the recognition of states of mind in others. Such topics 1092 
are also, of course, the focus of other contributions to this special issue. 1093 
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 1606 
Figure Captions 1607 
 1608 
Fig. 1. Group size and encephalization (here, executive brain ratio = volume of cortex over rest 1609 
of brain) in primates (based on Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). 1610 
 1611 
Fig. 2. Social learning and encephalization in primates. Frequency of social learning based on 1612 
the survey of Reader and Laland (2002) is plotted against executive brain ratio (see text for 1613 
further explanation). Added labels refer to three species with complex cultures discussed in the 1614 
text. 1615 
 1616 
47 
 
Fig. 3. An ‘open diffusion’ study with capuchin monkeys: (a) capuchin performing ‘lift’ 1617 
technique on artificial doorian fruit; (b) capuchin performing alternative ‘slide’ technique to 1618 
gain reward; (c) spread of each technique in groups where one male was first taught to use 1619 
either the lift or slide technique (data from Dindo et al. 2009). Each symbol represents the 1620 
proportion of each technique performed by each individual on consecutive days. Dark = slide, 1621 
light = lift. Numbers indicate the percentage of actions performed on day 7, corresponding to 1622 
that seeded in the group on day 1. 1623 
 1624 
Fig. 4. Entrainment of nut-cracking between observer and model. Example of frame-by-frame 1625 
measures of the height of the hand shown for model (blue) and younger observer (red). Time 1626 
series analyses of such episodes confirmed matching and even synchronic entrainment of hitting 1627 
actions (based on Fuhrmann et al., 2014). 1628 
 1629 
Fig. 5. Bodily imitation of manual versus oral opening of ‘aethipop’ artificial fruit by vervet 1630 
monkeys. Most monkeys, and most models, opened aethipops orally (a). In Hammer group, the 1631 
model opened it with her hands (b) and graphs show corresponding behavior of other group 1632 
members (d: first attempts with hands, e: all attempts with hands, based on van de Waal et al., 1633 
2012). In a further group, an individual opened aethipops using a third method (c) that also 1634 
spread: see van de Waal et al. (2012) for details. 1635 
 1636 
Fig. 6. Model linking species differences in mirror system circuitry, mirror system functional 1637 
responses, and social learning, after Hecht et al. (2013a) with permissioin. PFC: Prefrontal 1638 
cortex; MLF-ILF: Middle and inferior longitudinal fasicuili; SLFIII: Third branch of the 1639 
superior longitudinal fasciculus; EmC-ExC: Extreme capsule and external capsule. For further 1640 
explanation and discussion, see text.  1641 
1642 
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Table 1. Core studies reporting evidence for primate cultural variation in behaviour in the wild.  1643 
 1644 
Species and 
Year 
Studies and outline of evidence References 
Chimpanzee 
1999 
Building on earlier cited foundational studies, consortium of 
research leaders at 9 long term study sites completed first 
collaborative and systematic study, identifying 39 behaviours  
as cultural variants, common at some sites yet absent at 
others without apparent environmental or genetic 
explanation, (1,2). Further detailed studies of specific 
behaviours and ecological variables, including neighbouring 
communities, added finer supportive evidence (e.g. 3-7). 
Experiments highlighted local differences in cultural 
cognition (8-9).  
1. Whiten et al. 1999 
2. Whiten et al. 2001 
3. McGrew et al. 2001 
4. Crockford et al. 2004 
5. Möbius et al. 2008 
6. Schöning et al. 2008 
7. Luncz & Boesch 2014 
8. Gruber et al. 2011 
9. Kuhl et al. 2016 
White faced 
capuchin 
2002 
Comparison of different groups recorded the emergence, 
spread and loss of social customs involving intimate finger 
poking in nose and eyes (1), plus differences in foraging 
habits (2) and interspecies interactions (3). 
1. Perry et al. 2003 
2. Panger et al. 2002  
3. Rose et al. 2002 
Orangutan 
2003 
Replication of the chimpanzee methodology (1,2 above) 
identified 19-24 cultural variants (1) with more reported later 
(2). More detailed analyses of genetic and habitat variables 
identified some variants to be linked to environmental 
differences but strengthened conclusions about a cultural 
subset (3).  
1. van Schaik et al. 2003 
2. van Schaik 2009 
3. Kruzen et al. 2011 
Bonobo 
2003 
Application of the chimpanzee methodology identified a 
small set of cultural variants including few forms of tool use, 
unlike chimpanzees, but range of bonobos much smaller.  
Hohmann & Fruth 2003 
Olive baboon  
2004 
Death of dominant males through disease led to peaceful 
forms  of social interaction that continued to reign as new 
males populated the group, leading to inference of local 
‘pacific culture’. 
Sapolsky & Share 2004 
Japanese 
macaque 
2007 
34 styles of ‘stone handling’, an apparently functionless 
behaviour among provisioned monkeys, were identified, with 
different ones common or absent at different locations (1). 
Origin and spread of stone handling was earlier documented 
(2). Early reports of ‘protocultural’ behaviours like wheat 
sluicing are debated (3). 
1. Leca et al. 2007 
2. Huffman 1996 
3. Hirata et al. 2001 
Spider 
monkey 
 2011 
Following chimpanzee methodology (1,2 above) 22 variants 
identified between different groups, a majority social (1). 
Further study identified 14 additional behaviours 
differentially locally preferred, 6 of them inferred to be 
socially learned (2). 
1. Santorelli et al. 2011a 
2. Santorelli et al. 2011b 
Vervet 
monkey 
2014 
Differences in dietary preferences were identified between 
neighbouring groups that were not explicable by habitat and 
availability variables measured.  
Tournier et al. 2014 
Gorilla 
2016 
Following chimpanzee methodology (1,2 above) 23 putative 
cultural variants identified between different groups. 
Robbins et al. 2016 
Studies are listed chronologically by year of foundational paper; for well-studied species, other references 1645 
listed are selective rather than comprehensive. 1646 
1647 
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Table 2. Cultural diffusion experiments with non-human primates since the first field 1648 
experiments (2010).  1649 
authors species design content and findings 
van de Waal 2010 vervet monkey * group 
seeded 
Trained opening of an artificial fruit by models 
either lifting one door or sliding another spread to 
others in the groups so long as the model was a 
resident female. 
Kendal et al. 2010 ring-tailed lemur 
* 
group 
seeded 
An idiosyncratic technique to obtain food from an 
artificial fruit emerged in a subset of lemurs that 
were close associates, implicating social learning. 
Horner et al. 2010 chimpanzee group 
seeded  
Trained posting of tokens in two different 
receptacles to obtain food by reliable high ranking 
models spread to others in preference to those 
posted by low ranking models. 
Hopper et al. 2011 chimpanzee group 
seeded  
Trained trading of either of two types of tokens to 
obtain food spread to others even when the option 
shown gained less quality rewards. 
Dindo et al. 2011 orangutan chain Each of two different methods to open an artificial 
fruit (lift door versus slide door) spread 
preferentially along chains of five and six 
individuals respectively. 
Schnoell et al. 2012 red-fronted lemur 
* 
group 
seeded 
Individuals preferred whichever of two alternative 
techniques to open an artificial fruit was shown by a 
trained model in their group and in one of two 
unseeded groups a stable tradition focused on one 
technique emerged. 
van de Waal et al. 
2012 
vervet monkey  group 
seeded 
Four groups with model trained to open artificial 
fruit in each. Most used mouth to open fruit, but in 
group with model showing manual opening, this 
method spread to be more common; in group using 
cord to pull fruit apart, this likewise spread. 
Dean et al. 2012 chimpanzee, 
capuchin monkey 
group 
seeded 
An artificial fruit with three escalating levels of 
difficulty and reward was made available. In 
conditions where models proficient in the highest 
level were introduced, these did not spread, unlike 
in children in parallel experiments. 
Hopper et al. 2013 squirrel monkey group 
seeded 
Groups seeded with trained models pushing a door 
left or right to obtain food tended to adopt the 
method witnessed. Monkeys exposed instead to a 
‘ghost control’ in which the door moved without an 
agent did not succeed in gaining rewards. 
Claidiere et al. 
2013 
squirrel monkey group 
seeded 
Two groups with model trained to open artificial 
fruit by lift versus swing door. These methods 
spread differentially with a bias for those well 
connected in the social network to open the fruit 
earlier and use the method they witnessed. 
van de Waal et al. 
2013a 
vervet monkey  group 
seeded 
Four groups with model trained to open artificial 
fruit in each. Methods of lifting door versus sliding 
left or right spread more commonly in the group 
corresponding to seeded model. 
van de Waal et al. 
2013b 
vervet monkey * group 
seeded 
Whole groups were trained to avoid either pink or 
blue coloured maize corn made bitter. Naïve infants 
later tested with no bitter additive nevertheless 
copied maternal preference. Immigrant males 
switched quickly, conforming to new group 
preference. 
van Leeuwen et al. chimpanzee group Chimpanzees that had individually learned to use 
50 
 
2013 seeded either of two alternative tokens to gain rewards, or 
in other experiments use either of two targets for 
tokens, did not change their token use when 
exposed to a majority using the other option (they 
did not conform to a majority) but did switch when 
the alternative yielded a great payoff. 
Schnoell et al. 2014 red-fronted lemur 
* 
group 
seeded 
Some individuals in groups seeded with either of 
two methods to obtain food from an artificial fruit 
maintained the seeded preference over two years, 
others fluctuated in showing a preference or none, 
but none switched between preferences. 
Gunhold et al. 
2014a 
marmoset * group 
seeded 
Naïve individuals tended to adopt whichever of two 
alternative techniques to open an artificial fruit that 
the remainder of the whole group had learned X 
months earlier and maintained the preferences Y 
months later. 
Gunhold et al. 
2014b 
marmoset * group 
seeded 
Groups seeded with alternative foraging techniques 
through video displays in the forest exhibited 
associated bias in spread of these. 
Claidiere et al. 
2014 
Guinea baboon chain Patterns of pixels on a screen remembered by 
subjects became the stimuli for next animal in 
chain. Patterns became progressively structured, 
described as cumulative cultural transmission. 
Different lineages developed different regular 
patterns. 
Kendal et al. 2015 chimpanzee group 
seeded 
Statistical models fitted to the results of open 
diffusion experiments with two alternative 
techniques to obtain food seeded from trained 
models  
van de Waal et al. 
2015 
vervet monkey * group 
seeded 
Replication of 2013 van de Waal et al. paper with 
wild vervet monkeys. Lift door and slide door 
methods spread preferentially in groups seeded with 
these methods. 
Primate diffusion studies 2010-2015 (n = 19) from within a set of 30 for all animal species listed in 1650 
Whiten et al. 2016.  * = field study of wild subjects (n = 8); ‘group seeded’ = open diffusion with trained 1651 
model(s) seeded in group(s); ‘chain’ = diffusion chain. Effects are reported when statistically significant. 1652 
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